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WE PROBABLY CAN SAY, without provoking serious controversy, that 
broadly speaking there are two schools of thought on this question. 
One view is that a large public debt immobilizes the usefulness of 
monetary and credit policy. The other view is that the public debt 
has made monetary and credit policy more effective and more useful 
than ever. 
This paper will be confined to three questions. What is the nature 
of the case for each of these two points of view? What are the con- 
ditions necessary if credit policy is to be effective, given a large 
public debt? How can debt policy fit into a general program of 
economic stabilization? 
I 
A considerable tonnage of literature has emerged during the last 
six years dealing with how a large public debt impedes the proper 
exercise of credit policy. These issues are by now generally under- 
stood, and no useful purpose would be served in any extensive re- 
exploration of this material. It will only be necessary here, therefore, 
to sort out the principal reasons given for concluding that the emer- 
gence of the debt hinders the operation of credit policy. 
1. The inevitably large bank holdings of governments imposed by 
a large public debt tends to immunize the commercial banking sys- 
tem from the effects of Federal Reserve policy. This point is obvious. 
Their bulging portfolio of government securities provides the banks 
with a ready means of relaxing constraints on their inclination to 
expand credit otherwise imposed by a tightening reserve position. 
Securities can readily be sold in the market. If the market is con- 
gested, securities can be allowed to mature into cash, since most 
bank portfolios contain securities maturing every week. 
2. For most banks the Treasury, not businesses or other private 
borrowers, is the residual borrower. Private borrowers are the bank’s 
depositors. Competitive pressures, therefore, require that a bank 
accommodate those on whom it depends for its own existence. Con- 
sequently, the bank’s response to a tight reserve position is apt to 
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be a reduction in holdings of Treasury obligations, if necessary in 
order to take care of its private borrowers. 
3. The market weaknesses produced by a more disinflationary 
credit policy may discourage private buyers of Treasury obliga- 
tions. People are not inclined to buy securities during a period of 
falling security prices. Yet the Treasury’s requirements for funds 
for new money or for refunding must be met. The net result of a 
tighter monetary policy could, therefore, be enlarged Federal Re- 
serve open market purchases of Treasury obligations, and creation 
of additional bank reserves, and further expansion of bank credit 
and the money supply. The Treasury repeatedly emphasized this 
point in its replies to the Patman C0mrnittee.l 
4. Treasury debt operations either for new money or for refund- 
ing may of necessity be in excess of the funds currently available 
in the financial markets. A small borrower may be able substantially 
to enlarge the funds acquired by outbidding other borrowers on 
terms. The Treasury, however, because its operations are so large 
relative to the whole money and capital markets, as Mr. Roosa has 
pointed out, “cannot be fully certain that the magnitude of these 
funds, after they have been assembled, will be sufficient to meet 
the Treasury’s  need^."^ Mr. Roosa goes on to point out that normal- 
ly the Treasury can count on meeting its requirements if offerings 
are well designed “unless interest rates should be rising at the 
time under the pressure of a general tightness in credit avail- 
a b i l i t ~ . ” ~  
I1 
There is, however, a more optimistic view of what the public 
debt means for the usefulness of credit policy. According to this 
view, the public debt has extended the influence and effectiveness 
of monetary and credit policy. The public debt, large and widely 
held, means that the influence of Federal Reserve policy on financial 
markets generally is not limited to the remote echo effect produced 
by altering the reserve position of the commercial banks. The effects 
of Federal Reserve policy are extended quickly throughout the 
whole economy. 
We might, I think, refer to this as the New York Federal Re- 
serve Bank school of thought, since it has been so persuasively 
1. Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt .  Replies to  Questions 
and Other Material for the Use of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and 
Debt dlanagement (82d Congress, 2d Session, 1952), pp. 105-11. 
2. Robert V. Roosa, “Integrating Debt Management and Open Market Operations,” 
American Economic Review, Proceedings (May, 1952), p. 217. 
3. Ibid., p. 17. 
The Public Debt 161 
discussed by various officials of that institution. Mr. Sproul puts 
this whole matter very succinctly. 
I t  is a hopeful aspect of the situation, however, that the same circumstance 
which is primarily responsible for the problem helps to make its solution seem 
possible. Because of the size of the public debt, and its relative importance in 
the whole structure of public and private debts, the Federal Reserve System is 
now able to carry on its open market operations in a broad homogeneous market, 
embracing Government securities of all maturities, and the effects of its opera- 
tions are more quickly felt in all areas of the private sectors of the market than 
used to be the case.‘ 
The case for this more optimistic view is an impressive one. The 
large volume of government securities widely distributed means 
that the effects of Federal Reserve policy extend directly to all 
parts of the financial community. If security prices weaken and 
interest rates rise under pressure of open market sales, all financial 
institutions and the capital market generally are immediately af- 
fected. Prices of securities in all portfolios have declined. More 
important is the effect of market weaknesses on the demand for 
new securities. Viscosities are directly introduced into the market 
in which companies needing funds must float their new issues. In 
the “good old days” these longer-term borrowers and lenders were 
affected by Federal Reserve policy only to the more remote and 
uncertain extent to which short-term rate changes produced echo 
effects on longer rates. Now the influence is more direct and more 
immediate. 
This is abetted by the trend toward the increased institutionaliza- 
tion of savings. In  1951, for example, of $13.4 billion of liquid 
saving by individuals only $3.5 billion represented direct purchases 
of securities? The remaining $10 billion was channeled through 
various financial intermediaries such as insurance companies and 
pension funds. This means that decisions about how and when 
savings are made available to potential borrowers are now primarily 
made by professional credit and portfolio managers, with their in- 
evitably greater sensitivity to changes in market conditions. 
Moreover, with the widely distributed public debt, the Federal 
Reserve exerts a more direct effect on not only the financial markets 
but the economy generally. Market weaknesses reduce the range 
of assets which can be considered appropriate for necessary liquidity 
4. Allan Sproul, ‘$Changing Concepts of Central Banking,” in Money, Trade, and 
Economic Growth, Essays in Honor of John H .  Williams (New York: Macmillan Co., 
1951), p. 321. Cf. also essay by Robert V. Roosa of the New York Federal Reserve 
Bank in the same volume. 
5.  Securities and Exchange Commission, Statistical Series Release No. 1114, Octo- 
ber 5 ,  1952. 
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requirements. And the uncertainties associated with these develop- 
ments are very apt to create an added awareness of the need for 
the protection which greater liquidity affords. 
The connection between changes in liquidity and the flow of 
spending on output is, of course, complex. We know, in fact, too 
little about these matters. The increased attention being given to 
these problems even at the theoretical level, suggests, however, that 
this is a point of some significance in appraising the present effective- 
ness of credit policy.s 
These observations about the significance of the debt for credit 
policy point up two conclusions. T h e  public debt does limit the 
Federal Reserve’s freedom of action. O n  the other hand, the exist- 
ence of the public debt has extended the range of influence of Fed- 
eral Reserve policy. 
Whether, therefore, on balance the public debt means a more or 
a less effective execution of credit policy depends on the net result 
of these two diverging considerations. What are the conditions which 
must be met if the first is not to outweigh the second? What de- 
termines, in a word, whether the public debt means a more or a less 
effective credit policy? It is to these matters we now turn. 
I11 
If the existence of the debt on balance is to sharpen the effective- 
ness of credit policy, two basic conditions must be met. 
1. Modest changes in Federal Reserve policy must produce 
changes in the volume of private spending on goods and services. 
That the Federal Reserve is now able to exert substantial influence 
on yield rates and prices of securities generally through policy 
changes which thirty years ago would have seemed quite modest 
seems now pretty well established. 
What is less clear is whether these modest shifts in yield rates 
and security prices, and associated changes, influence private spend- 
ing. Are some capital outlays a casualty of these developments? 
To what extent can the volume of consumer spending be made 
different from what it otherwise would have been? If so, how do 
these things work out? What is the nature of the evidence? On these 
matters we have insufficient theoretical and empirical evidence, and 
this constitutes a substantial difficulty in arriving at  any conclusion 
about whether monetary policy is now more or less useful. We can 
say this. A modest tightening of credit is probably not inflationary; 
6 .  Cf. Kenneth E. Boulding, A Reconstruction of Ecoitomics (New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, Tnc., 1950), particularly pp. 79-94. 
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a severe credit stringency will almost surely produce a recession. 
It may, however, be that moderate changes will not significantly 
deflect the momentum of private spending. Economic relationships 
may have enough “play” so that we are dealing with a threshold 
problem-the pressure of credit policy must build up to a certain 
point before it can produce a visible displacement in private spend- 
ing.’ This point may or may not be beyond the limits imposed on 
credit policy by the public debt. 
The price stability of the last eighteen months seems, however, 
to suggest that moderately restrictive Federal Reserve policy can 
exert a significant influence on business conditions. Unemployment 
is at  levels generally considered too low to be consistent with price 
stability. Banks have been under substantially enough reserve pres- 
sure to push member bank borrowing up to about the $2 billion 
level and thereby re-establish the influence of discount policy. Yet 
during the last eighteen months loan rates have increased only 0.2 
per cent, and yields on long-term Treasury obligations are only 
fractionally aboLe year-ago levels. 
2.  Within the limits of modest changes in Federal Reserve policy, 
the Treasury must be able to meet its requirements for funds, 
either new money or refunding, through normal market processes. 
Indeed the Treasury’s success in the market importantly determines 
the limits of Federal Reserve policy. If the Treasury is to meet with 
reasonable success in the market, four interrelated conditions must 
be met. 
a )  Cost of servicing the debt must be a secondary consideration. 
The Treasury must obviously set rates on new obligations reflecting 
market conditions if it is to attract sufficient new funds. If rates 
are held lower, the debt operation will almost certainly go sour 
without Federal Reserve help. That is, of course, obvious. One 
further point is, however, worth making. Any Secretary of the 
Treasury will readily agree that the debt’s service charge is cer- 
tainly a consideration subordinate to economic stability generally 
in shaping debt policy. The complexity and uncertainty of the re- 
lationship between a tighter credit policy and, for example, the 
cost of living index or gross national product may incline any 
finance minister, at the time each specific decision must be made, 
to be very much aware of this easy and frequently used way to 
calibrate the success of his administration-i.e., did he service the 
debt cheaply? Holding down the interest cost of the debt may, 
7. Cf. George Katona, Psychological Foundations of Economic Behaviar (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1951), particularly pp. 142-45. 
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in a word, not be an important consideration, but it may be a very 
pressing one. 
In  their joint replies to the Patman Committee the Federal Re- 
serve Bank presidents state the matter very positively, “It is the 
Treasury’s inherent responsibility for combatting inflation that it 
offer securities which are acceptable to the market.”’ 
b )  The debt must not be “too large”-a term, which is, of 
course, a bit difficult to define. The nature of the problem can, how- 
ever, be made clear. Government securities are for understandable 
reasons generally regarded as quite liquid assets. The economy 
generally needs a certain amount of these liquid assets for “sec- 
ondary reserves.” When the supply of these securities is substan- 
tially in excess of the needs of businesses and people for liquid 
assets, however, the excess will tend to be infirmly held. And there 
will be a tendency to shift out of government securities and into 
other assets, or in order to finance stepped-up spending generally. 
How large the public debt can be, therefore, depends in part on 
whether the Treasury can fund that part of the debt not needed 
for “secondary reserves” into securities generally considered to 
be illiquid. 
While many of these problems would be easier to deal with if the 
debt were a bit smaller, there is little evidence that the size of the 
present debt creates a problem beyond the capacity of the financial 
markets to handle. The ratio of total debt, private and public, to 
the size of the economy is smaller now than before World War I 
and considerably below the ratio prevailing prior to the Great De- 
pression. Apparently, we are not being asked to hold a volume of 
securities out of line with the size of the economy (Table 1). 
c) The liquidity of the debt is a function of its maturity distribu- 
tion as well as size. Here a real problem remains. While the total 
debt is now $50 billion lower than in mid-1946, the volume of 
marketable securities due or callable within one year is $9 billion 
larger. 
The volume of commercial banks Treasury obligations callable or 
maturing within five years was 29.8 per cent of their deposits in 
mid-1952, compared with 25.9 per cent in mid-1946. I t  is clear that 
the management of the debt in the postwar period has augmented the 
liquidity overhang as more and more of the debt got bunched at 
the short maturity end. Thus, though the debt in the hands of the 
8. Monetary Policy and the Management of the Public Debt. Replies to Questions 
and Other Material f o ~  the Use of the Subcommittee on General Credit Control and 
Debt Management (82d Congress, 2d Session, 1952), p. 687. 
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public was declining, reflecting Treasury cash surpluses, the size 
of debt operations was expanding because of refunding requirements. 
The maturity distribution of the debt clearly must be length- 
ened. The Federal Reserve cannot otherwise be certain that it will 
not need to come to the Treasury's rescue if a very heavy private 
demand for long-term funds should coincide with large debt opera- 
tions. We should not assume, however, that any major alteration 
in the maturity structure of the debt can be accomplished quickly. 
If the debt is to be composed of additional longer-term securities, 
someone must buy. them. 
TABLE 1 
TOTAL NET PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DEBT AND GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT 
(Dollar Amounts in Billions) 
YEAR TOTAL DEBT G.N.P. 
1916 $ 82 $ 48 
1925 . . . . . . . . . .  163 91 
1929 . . . . . . . . . .  191 104 
1940 . . . . . . . . . .  191 101 
1945 . . . . . . . . . .  407 215 
1951 . . . . . . . . . .  519 329 
. . . . . . . . . .  
Source: US. Department of Commerce; 
are my own estimates. 
RATIO OP 
Debt to G.N.P. Pvt. Debt to Total Debt 
1.70 .98 
1.78 .88 
1.84 .91 
1.88 .77 
1.88 .3 8 
1.58 .s4 
G.N.P. data for 1916 and 1925 
TABLE 2 
MATURITY DISTRIBUTION OF US. GOVERNMENT 
MARKETABLE S CURITIES 
(Dollar Amounts in Billions) 
Callable or Maturing Dollar Amounts Percentage Distribution 
6/30/46 9/30/52 6/30/46 9/30/52 
Within 1 year. . . . . . . . . . .  .$ 61.9 $ 70.8 32.6 50.5 
1-5 years.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  19.0 29.4 10.0 21.0 
5-10 years.. . . . . . . . . . . . . .  44.9 13.3 23.7 9.5 
10-20 years.. . . . . . . . . . . . .  20.0 26.7 10.6 19.0 
Over 20 years.. . . . . . . . . . .  43.6 . . .  23.1 . . .  
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  .$189.6 $140.2 100.0 100.0 
Source: Federal Reserve BdIcfin.  
TABLE 3 
COMMERCIAL BANK DEPOSITS AND HOLDINGS OF US. GOVERNMENT SECURITIES 
(Dollar Amounts in Billions) 
GOV'T SECURITIES 
MATURING OR CALLABLE IN 5 YEARS ALL GOV'T SECURITIES 
YEAR Ratio of Deposits Ratio of Deposits 
(June 30) DEPOSITS Amt. (Per Cent) Ant.  (Per Cent) 
1946 . . . . . . . . .  $142.9 $76.6 53.7 $3 7 .O 25.9 
1948 . . . . . . . . .  138.1 57.6 41.6 47.4 34.2 
1950 . . . . . . . . .  142.8 59.0 41.0 49.2 34.2 
1952 . . . . . . . . .  160.7 53.9 33.6 47.8 29.8 
Source: Federal Reserve Bullelin. 
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d )  We must have an adequate budget and fiscal policy. If tax 
revenues are inappropriate and inadequate, Treasury requirements 
for funds may be in excess of what can readily be attracted in a 
period of generally active private demand for funds. Since Treasury 
needs must be met somehow, the Federal Reserve would be impelled 
to step in with a volume of market purchases otherwise inappro- 
priate to the general credit and economic situation. 
Here the postwar record has been quite impressive. Excepting 
1949, every fiscal year since the end of the war has shown a cash 
surplus. For the whole period (fiscal years 1947-52) the aggregate 
cash surpluses were $22 billion. It would hardly be realistic to ex- 
pect that we would do much better. 
IV 
Can we manage the debt so it will do more for us than to permit 
a more effective operation of credit policy? Can it, in short, have 
a role of its own to play in a general stabilizing policy? This is a 
side of the debt management question which can use some more 
thinking and study. It is a question which was not so extensively 
explored in the Patman material, and only a few observations will 
be made about this here. 
One approach to this matter has been in terms of contra-cyclical 
shifts in the liquidity “center of gravity” of the debt. Some Treasury 
obligations are more liquid than others. A three-month Treasury 
bill is, of course, considered to be more liquid than a long-term 
bond. Thus by lengthening maturities and generally shifting the 
debt into less liquid securities during a boom, some restraint might 
be imposed on spending. I n  a recession the debt should, of course, 
be shifted into more liquid securities. This is a matter which needs 
more systematic analysis. We do not yet know very much about 
how changes in the debt’s liquidity do influence private decisions to 
spend. It is clear that extremes of liquidity or illiquidity seem 
to produce correspondingly extreme results. Moreover, the “right” 
basic maturity distribution is certainly the essential starting point 
for good monetary and debt policy generally. 
The real question is whether alterations in the maturity distribu- 
tion and liquidity of the debt substantial enough to promise a visible 
effect on private spending would not require unrealistically large 
debt operations, since in a boom large sales of longer-term, relatively 
illiquid securities would be difficult to carry out. 
Henry Simons has provided us with a lead which we might use- 
fully explore further. You will recall his proposal that government 
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bonds be sold during a boom to mop up funds, with the process 
reversed in a recession? The Treasury should, in a word, withdraw 
funds from the spending stream during a boom by borrowing them. 
It would in effect be pre-emptive borrowing since the budget (as- 
suming appropriate fiscal policy) would be enjoying a cash surplus. 
The funds thus withdrawn from the spending stream could then be 
immobilized in Treasury tax and loan balances or used for debt 
retirement in such a way as not to enlarge the public’s money sup- 
ply or bank reserves. A volume of this pre-emptive borrowing so 
small as to produce little visible statistical change in the debt struc- 
ture might still withdraw a significant volume of funds which pri- 
vate borrowers would otherwise acquire and spend. This presumably 
was the rationale of postwar savings bond issues, conducted at a 
time when the Treasury was already showing a cash surplus. 
These are issues which might usefully be further explored. If 
some elbow room could be found for such debt operations, debt 
management policy might be fitted with monetary, credit, and fiscal 
policy into a general stabilizing program. Taxation and fiscal policy 
can withdraw funds from the spending stream in a boom, but ex- 
perience shows it to be cumbersome and inflexible. 
Through debt management, funds difficult to reach by taxation 
can also be withdrawn from the spending stream. 
Through credit and monetary policy the creation of new money 
can be limited. These are simply alternative and complementary 
ways to influence the pace of spending-all by altering the volume 
of spendable funds in the hands of the public. 
Where do we come out in this analysis of the significance of the 
debt for credit policy? These conclusions are, I think, clear. A 
large public debt does limit the Federal Reserve’s freedom of action. 
The large debt, however, also extends the Federal Reserve’s influ- 
ence and increases the sensitivity of the economy to Federal Re- 
serve policy. 
If the latter is to outweigh the former, two basic conditions must 
be met. There must be some sensitivity of private spending to 
moderate policy changes. The Treasury must be able to meet its 
requirements for funds through normal market processes. This re- 
quires a proper budget policy, a debt structure which does not pro- 
vide chronically a volume of highly liquid securities in excess of 
the economy’s requirements, and a willingness to adjust yield rates 
9. Henry Simons, Economic Policy for a Free Society (Chicago: University of Chi- 
cago, 1948), chaps. vii-x, particularly chap. ix. 
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on new Treasury issues in line with the market. Experience of the 
last few years seems to indicate that credit policy can exert a sub- 
stantial influence on business conditions-though I believe current 
discussions suggest that the Federal Reserve and credit policy have 
as much to fear from their enthusiastic friends as from their enemies. 
Finally, we need to explore further the question of how far debt 
management can not only help credit policy but play a limited role 
of its own in altering the volume of the public’s spendable funds. 
